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NICOLE ORESME AND MODI RERUM*
STEFANO CAROTI
   Among the precious treasures poured out by prof. De Rijk's Logica Moder-
norum we can find also texts referring to a theory that has been wholly de-
veloped in the XIVth century: the modi rerum, whose close relationship with 
the complexe significabile was noticed by Gabriel Nuchelmans1 and which have 
probably some resemblances with what Ars Meliduna holds about the mean-
ing of  the  enuntiabile2.  Oresme's  commentary on the  Physics3 is  a  very  in-
* This paper was prepared and sent to the International Conference «30 years Logica mo-
dernorum» held in Amsterdam in November 1997 in honour of the late prof. Lambertus 
M. de Rijk . I was invited to contribute with a paper to the Conference, but I was not 
able to be present, because of serious problems in my Department. I should like to ex-
press my gratitude to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities 
and Social Sciences, where I spent 10 months as Resident Fellow from September 1996 
till June 1997 working at the transcription of Oresme's commentary on the Physics. I am 
also grateful to Zenon Kaluza for his precious remarks.
1 GABRIEL NUCHELMANS,  Theories of the Propositions. Ancient and medieval conceptions of the  
bearers  of  truth  and  falsity,  Amsterdam-London,  North-Holland  Publishing  Company 
1973 (North-Holland Linguistic Series, 8), chaps. 15 and 16, and pp. 274-276 in particu-
lar for modi rerum. 
2 LAMBERTUS M. DE RIJK, Logica Modernorum. A contribution to the history of early terminist lo-
gic, II, 2: The Origin and early Development of the Theory of Supposition, Assen, Van Gorcum 
1967, p. 357; cf. NUCHELMANS, Theories of the Propositions, cit., p. 209, where the position 
defended by the Ars Meliduna is labelled as ‘reist’.
3 In collaboration with Henry Hugonnard-Roche, Jean Celeyrette,  Edmond Mazet and 
Stefan Kirschner I am preparing the edition of this commentary. S. Kirschner has pub-
lished the questions on books III-IV and some of book V (6 th-9th (STEFAN KIRSCHNER, 
Nicolaus Oresmes  Kommentar  zur  Physik  des  Aristoteles.  Kommentar  mit  Edition  der  
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teresting witness of the modi rerum-theory, which have not yet received the at-
tention it deserves4. Oresme makes recourse to the modi rerum in very import-
ant occasions, such as in discussing the nature of accidents, of privatio, of mo-
tion, of place; we cannot, nevertheless, unfortunately find in his commentary 
an explicit and thorough presentation of this theory. The analysis of the con-
texts in which it is used, however, not only consents to appreciate its philo-
sophical relevance, but also provides some indications of Oresme's possible 
sources. Through modi or  dispositiones rerum Oresme is able to avoid a com-
mitment either to a realist or to a terminist ontology, to use traditional labels. 
In this paper I shall consider Oresme's polemical use of modi rerum (1.), 
Quaestionen zu Buch 3 und 4 der aristotelischen Physik sowie von vier Quaestionen zu Buch 5 , 
Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag 1997 (Sudhoffs Archiv. Beihefte, H. 39). This commentary 
has been preserved only by one manuscript (Sevilla, Biblioteca Capitular y Colombina, 
ms. 7-6-30), discovered by Guy Beaujouan, see GUY BEAUJOUAN,  Manuscrits scientifiques  
médiévaux de la Bibliothèque Colombine de Seville, in: Actes du Dixième Congrès International  
d'Histoire des Sciences (Ithaca 26 VIII-2 IX 1962), Paris, Hermann 1964, p. 633; see also 
STEFANO CAROTI, La position de Nicole Oresme sur la nature du mouvement («Questiones su-
per Physicam», III, 1-8). Problèmes gnoséologiques, ontologiques et sémantiques, in «Archives 
d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age» LXI, 1994, pp. 303-385: p. 304, n. 1. On 
the importance of the Physics commentaries of this period see EDITH D. SYLLA, Aristoteli-
an Commentaries and Scientific Change: The Parisian Nominalists on the Cause of the Natural  
Motion of Inanimate Bodies, in «Vivarium» XXXI, 1993, pp. 37-83; EAD., Transmission of the  
new physics of the fourteenth century from England to the continent, in STEFANO CAROTI and 
PIERRE SOUFFRIN (eds.),  La  nouvelle  physique  du  XIVe  siècle,  Firenze,  Olschki  1997 
(Biblioteca di Nuncius. Studi e testi, XXIV) , pp. 65-110, see also STEFANO CAROTI, Nuovi  
linguaggi e filosofia della natura: i limiti delle potenze attive in alcuni commenti parigini ad  
Aristotele, in STEFANO CAROTI (ed.) and JOHN E. MURDOCH (intr.), Studies in Medieval Nat-
ural Philosophy, Firenze, Olschki 1989 (Biblioteca di Nuncius. Studi e testi, I), pp. 177-
226. See now: NICOLE ORESME, Questiones super Physicam (Books I-VII), ed. by S. Caroti, J. 
Celeyrette,  S.  Kirschner,  E.  Mazet,  Leiden-Boston,  Brill  2013 (Studien  und Texte  zur 
Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 112).
4 I have dealt with this topic in Oresme’s discussion on motion, see CAROTI, La position de  
Nicole Oresme sur la nature du mouvement, cit., pp. 335-342;  STEFANO CAROTI,  Oresme on  
Motion (Questiones super Physicam III, 2-7), in «Vivarium», XXXI (1993), pp. 27-33. See 
also  JEAN CELEYRETTE and  EDMOND MAZET, La  hiérarchie  des  degrés  d’être  chez  Nicole  
Oresme, in «Arabic Sciences and Philosophy» VIII, 1998, pp. 45-65, KIRSCHNER,  Nicolaus  
Oresmes Kommentar zur Physik, cit., pp. 38-41.
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trying to set it in the larger context of both his ontology (3.) and his epistemo-
logy (4.). Oresme's challenge to either a realist or terminist ontology by means 
of modi rerum conceals probably an attack to William Ockham; Oresme refers 
explicitly to Ockham concerning exclusive propositions, but I think that on 
many other occasions the polemical target of Oresme's criticism can be reas-
onably identified in William Ockham5 or in some unnamed followers of the 
Venerabilis Inceptor (5.). Some hints are reserved also to the possible sources 
of Oresme's modi rerum (2).
1. The polemical use of modi rerum resorts clearly from the three dif-
ferent meanings of 'accidens' in the 5th questio of the first book («Utrum ens sit 
univocum ad substantiam et ad accidens»)6.  Accidens can be viewed as: a) a 
vera forma inherens substantie; b) a term denoting a particular state of the sub-
stance7: c) a  modus or  dispositio rei (Oresme does not use these words in this 
context), which can be expressed through the infinitive "aliquod tale esse" (for 
quality) or "tantum esse" (for quantity)8. We do not find here any hint neither 
to  modi rerum or to  complexe significabile, which is, however, presented in its 
5 See infra, n. 39 for a not better specified glossa occamica.
6 ORESME, Questiones super Physicam, cit., pp. 31-39.
7 Or even a substance in the case of accidents of the category of quality; Oresme deals 
with this problem elsewhere, see below.
8 «Secundo, notandum quod accidens potest  ymaginari tripliciter:  uno modo quod sit 
vera forma inherens substantie, sicut forma substantialis, licet non intrinsece, ita quod 
sit vera essentia demonstrata divisibilis et extensa ad extensionem subiecti et proprie si-
gnificabilis nomine substantivo, sicut ymaginantur de albedine. Secundo modo, quod 
accidens nullo modo preter animam sit alia res ab ipsa substantia subiecta, sed solum sit  
ipsa substantia taliter se habens, secundum quod de ea dicuntur diversa predicata, et sic  
accidens non esset aliud a substantia nisi predicatum, et isto modo dicunt aliqui de quo-
libet accidente excepta qualitate. Tertia via alia est, et posset ymaginari quod accidens 
non esset proprie forma extensa vel inherens secundum primam viam, nec solum sub-
stantia vel predicatum vel terminus iuxta secundam viam, sed esset aliquid tale esse aut 
tantum esse. Verbi gratia quod albedo non esset aliud quam album esse, quod proprie 
significaretur per nomen concretum et isto infinitivo ‘esse’ et per nomen adiectivum», 
ORESME, Questiones super Physicam, cit., p. 34.
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linguistic form. This passage is all the same very important, because what in 
other  parts  of  the  commentary  is  labelled  as  modus or  dispositio  rei is 
introduced here as a third solution which permits to bypass either a realist or 
a  terminist  view  of  accidents.  The  generic  reference  to  the  aliqui,  who 
maintain that the accidents, with the sole exception of those in the category of 
quality, are only terms, is clearly to a position identical with Ockham's.
In the 15th questio of the first book, concerning the denotation of the term 
privatio («Utrum privatio sit ens»9) Oresme proposes again a threefold distinc-
tion, but we do not meet here with an opposition between realist and termin-
ist solutions, at least not in a clear cut way as in the above quoted passage on 
accidents. The first position relies upon the difference between significatio and 
connotatio and does not plead for the existence of a special thing denoted by 
the term 'privatio'.  Privatio, in fact, stands for (supponit pro) matter, and con-
notes that it has not a suited form10. According to the terminist view privatio is 
nothing but a propositio, which must be true when a natural change occurs11. 
9 Ibid., pp. 112- 118.
10 «Primus modus est quod privatio est aliquid, quia est materia privata, ita quod hec no-
mina ‘materia’,  ‘subiectum’ et  ‘privatio’  supponunt pro eodem, sed tamen ‘privatio’ 
connotat aliquid, scilicet subiectum carere forma que nata est esse in ipso. Et ideo uni-
versaliter ista nomina <sunt> sinonima: ‘privatum’ et ‘privatio’, ‘cecum’ et ‘cecitas’, et 
sic de aliis […]. Ista potest probari, quia hec videtur intentio Aristotelis, quia dicit quod 
materia et privatio sunt unum in numero et differunt ratione. Et exponitur, id est diffini-
tione exprime<n>te quid nominis, quia, licet hec nomina idem significent, tamen non 
unum connotant. Secundo, frustra fit multitudo ubi sufficit paucitas. Et per hoc proba-
tur primo huius quod principia non sunt plura tribus, quia sufficiunt; modo omnia pos-
sunt salvari ponendo tantum duo principia, sicut patet ex solutione argumentorum, que 
omnia solvuntur per tales expositiones et connotationes nominum», ibid., p. 113.
11 «Secundus modus est quod privatio non est materia, immo proprie non est privatio, 
sed, si dicatur esse principium, hoc est pro tanto quod hoc nomine intelligitur quedam 
propositio copulativa, quam oportet esse veram; et est ista: ‘subiectum est et quedam 
forma non est in subiecto quam natum est habere’. Et ideo non est aliud dicere privatio-
nem esse principium, nisi quod ad transmutationem naturalem requiritur quod hec co-
pulativa sit vera, ac si hoc nomen causa brevitatis poneretur loco istarum propositio-
num», ibid.
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The arguments against the two first solutions, collected in two conclu-
sions, prepare the explicit formulation of the third one, which, according to 
Oresme, «magis concordat dictis Aristotelis et etiam sensui naturali et etiam 
dictis antiquorum»12; for this solution privatio is not matter but «materiam pri-
vatam esse aliquo»13. Even though this solution does not apparently differs 
from the first, they can not be confused: in the first solution the denotation is 
matter, while in this one it is a conditio privativa of matter itself. I think that we 
are facing here a different situation from that we met in the discussion about 
accidents: to stress the difference between his and the first solution, Oresme is 
ready to admit that privatio can be viewed as an accident, contrary to what he 
maintains in the 13th question of the first book, and in neat contrast with his 
effort to reduce all the categories but substance to modi rerum, as we shall see 
below. In this context Oresme is evidently arguing against two different as-
pects or levels of what for him is a terminist point of view, which he at any 
rate distinguishes carefully,  so much so that they are presented as distinct 
solutions.
The virulence of the arguments against the first position induces to as-
sume that it is Oresme's true polemical target: according to him, in fact, to 
maintain the sinonimity between cecus and cecitas is not only contrary to lo-
gic,  but  also  destroys  the differences  between Plato  and Aristoteles14.  The 
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 116. «Tertia conclusio est quod privatio est subiectam materiam privatam esse 
aliquo vel aliquid simile. Et ita dico de qualibet privatione, sicut tenebra, malitia, defor-
mitas et quecumque similia. Et hec est intentio Augustini in  Encheiridion. Et tale quid 
potest dici ‘ens privatum’ vel ‘accidens privativum’ aut ‘condicio privativa’».
14 Oresme  quotes  the  commentary  of  Averroes,  where  Plato  is  accused  for  having 
confused matter and privation: «Et sit prima conclusio contra primum modum. Et est 
ista quod materia non est privatio, sed subiectum. Probo sic, quia sequeretur quod ista 
essent synonima: ‘privatum’, ‘privatio’, ‘cecum’, ‘cecitas’. Consequentiam ipsi probant, 
sed consequens est contra Aristotelem in Postpredicamentis..sed .cecus dicitur homo, ce-
citas vero homo nullo modo dicitur. Et ideo, sicut homo non est cecitas, ita nec materia 
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identification between privatio and materia, moreover, is very dangerous also 
on the moral level, because it seems to foster a very different idea of evil than 
Augustine's, and it does not permit to discriminate between natura, which as 
a  God's  creature  is  good,  and  malitia which  is  a  privation15.  The  second 
position has not, however, less dangerous implications, because if privation is 
nothing, corrupted things can be continuously regenerated16. 
In the fourth argument against this solution Oresme asks if the meaning 
of the proposition which denotes privatio is something or nothing at all17; in 
his reply he states that it can not obviously be nothing, because propositions 
and terms have a meaning which is granted by extra linguistic entities18. The 
privatio  est.  Secundo,  sic:  si  ita  esset,  sequitur  quod  non  esset  differentia  inter 
positionem  Aristotelis  et  positionem  Platonis  de  principiis  rerum  naturalium. 
Consequens  est  expresse  contra  Aristotelem,  qui  nititur  improbare  Platonem.  Probo 
consequentiam per Commentatorem commento 79 et etiam 78 ante, qui dicit expresse 
quod  Plato  deficit  in  hoc  quod  posuit  quod  materia  est  privatio,  et  non  ponebat 
differentiam», ibid., pp. 113-114.
15 «Quarto, arguo generaliter de quacumque privatione, sicut de turpitudine, de malitia, 
cecitate etc., et suppono quod cecitas non est aliud quam hominem esse cecum, aut ma-
litia quam hominem esse malum, nisi in casu ubi est unus habitus. Tunc arguitur sic: illa 
distinguuntur et non sunt idem, quorum unum est bonum, antiquum, cognitum et di-
lectum, et aliud per oppositum est malum et novum, ignotum et oditum. Modo sic est 
quod natura hominis homicide est bona, antiqua, cognita et dilecta, et tamen homici-
dium vel esse homicidam vel cecum vel aliquid tale in casu potest esse et debet esse 
<oditum> et malum, ignotum et talia», ibid., p. 114. Oresme is quoting the Sententia LXV 
of Prosperus’ of Aquitania Sententie ex Augustino, see PROSPERI AQUITANI, Opera (Expositio  
Salmorum, Liber Sententiarum), Turnhout, Brepols 1972 (CCSL, LXVIIIA), p. 273.
16 «Secundo, ratione Commentatoris […] nisi esset aliquid, sequitur quod corruptum ite-
rum posset generari, quod habetur pro impossibili. Consequentia patet, quia post eius 
corruptionem omnia essent sicut erant ante, puta materia et agens, quia, si privatio nihil 
fuisset, nihil esset minus quam ante», ORESME, Questiones super Physicam, cit., p. 115.
17 «Quarto, secundum illum modum dicendi, hoc nomen ‘privatio’ est loco unius proposi-
tionis copulative; tunc quero utrum sic esse sicut ipsa significat sit aliquid, et <si sic> 
habeo propositum. Si nihil, tunc dimittatur pro nihilo, sicut prius», ibid., p. 115.
18 «Et arguo sicut Augustinus: impossibile est cecitatem esse nisi sit oculus, et impossibile 
est iniustitiam esse nisi sit homo iniustus; igitur tale debet dici aliquid. Consequentia 
patet, quia, si nihil esset sicut chimera, tunc nihil requiritur ad hoc quod propositiones 
vel voces illud significent», ibid., p.115.
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reference to the meaning of the proposition is very important, because it can 
provide a possible source of the modi rerum.
We have so far considered passages where the  modi  rerum  are intro-
duced in a threefold distinction concerning respectively the meanings of acci-
dens and of privatio19; in the questions of the third book of the Physics, where 
the denotation of the term 'motus' is discussed, we face a more complex situ-
ation,  where  five  different  solutions  are  presented20.  Having already dealt 
with this topic elsewhere, in this paper I limit myself to stress the difference 
between Oresme's own solution and the mobile-theory. 
Together with the realist -- which is considered the worst -- and the ter-
minist view (according to which motion is nothing), we can find here a third 
solution, the  mobile-theory (which is also Ockham's), praised by Oresme for 
not  introducing  new  things  in  order  to  explain  motion.  The  difference 
between  this  solution  and  the  modi  rerum one,  supported  by  Oresme,  is 
clearly identified in a different opinion as far as the meaning of the expres-
sion aliter se habere is concerned: «quia ymaginatur quod taliter se habere non 
sit nisi res sic se habens»21. This statement seems to point out that the differ-
19  For other threefold distinctions see CAROTI, La position de Nicole Oresme sur la nature du  
mouvement, cit., pp. 313, 337, 340.
20  Ibid., pp. 12-27.
21 «Prima que dicit quod motus nihil est: capiendo ‘aliquid’ pro eo quod vere est aliquid, 
concedendum est, sicut dicit Aristoteles quod accidens non est ens, sed est entis […]. Se-
cunda, que dicit quod motus est multa, licet parum valeat, tamen veritas est quod ad 
hoc quod motus sit, oportet multa esse, quia indivisibile non movetur. Tertia, que dicit 
quod est mobile, quia ymaginatur quod taliter se habere non sit nisi res sic se habens, 
secundum hoc habet apparentiam, quia etiam ista condicio vel fluxus non est tale supe-
radditum,  sicut  multi  ymaginantur,  nec  est  res  separabilis  quacumque  virtute  […]. 
Quarta, ponens quod est acquisitum, etiam est vera, quia <motus> uno modo capitur 
pro acquisito, sed falsa est in eo quod negat aliam acceptionem. Alia, que ponit quod est 
fluxus ad modum unius forme distincte, sicut esset albedo vel anima vel aliquod tale, 
est omnium pessima; tamen si intelligatur quod non sit talis forma vel talis res, sed mo-
dus vel condicio ipsius mobilis, tunc est verissima et probabilior et facilior inter omnes, 
et concordat dictis Aristotelis et philosophorum», ibid., pp. 340-341 .
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ence between the two solutions relies on a more clear cut distinction between 
a state of affairs, a condition of the mobile (the modi rerum), and the mobile it-
self. 
This  difference can be linguistically  rendered through the distinction 
between res sic se habens or res aliter se habens and rem taliter (or sic) se habere or 
rem aliter se habere, a distinction that sometime is used by Oresme to illustrate 
the divergence between his modi rerum and the terminist point of view. An al-
lusion to the ontological status of what is rendered trough expressions includ-
ing adverbs like aliter and qualiter22 consents a more precise appraisal of this 
distinction: the 'taliter', 'qualiter' or 'aliquo modo esse' do not exclude a denota-
tion of what is expressed through the linguistic forms in which they are used, 
contrary to what defended in the discussion on motion by the mobile-theory, 
where only the mobile is the denotation of the term motus. The diminished on-
tology of such propterties or states of affairs do not prevent from acknow-
ledging the difference, as clearly intended by Oresme in opposing the modus 
rei to the res aliter se habens. Both positions are, at any rate, very resolute in op-
posing a realist point of view, with Oresme assuming a more reductionist atti-
22 In the 19th question of the first book («Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis principia sint 
contraria», ibid., pp. 143-151): «Ultimum dubium est quia videtur quod privatio non sit 
contraria forme, quia dicit Aristoteles quod privatio est per se non ens, igitur generatio 
dicitur transmutatio de non esse simpliciter. Et si privatio esset, ipsa esset causa appeti-
tus sue corruptionis, quod est contra Aristotelem, quia omne ens diligit se permanere. 
Respondeo quod ‘esse simpliciter’ potest esse equivocum: uno modo dicitur esse sim-
pliciter, id est principaliter et non secundum quid; et illo modo privatio est non <esse> 
simpliciter et per se non ens. Alio modo simpliciter, id est universaliter, sic quod non 
ens simpliciter, id est nullo modo ens; et sic privatio non est non ens simpliciter, sed est  
ens aliquo modo, ita quod ly ‘aliquo modo’ dicitur esse determinatio diminuens, sicut 
possemus dicere ‘taliter’, ‘qualiter’. Ideo dicit Aristoteles quarto Metaphysice quod pri-
vationes <et> negationes quodammodo esse dicimus; similiter cum dicimus quod gene-
ratio est de non esse simpliciter, potest dici quod forma nullo modo erat ante; vel quod 
est de privatione, que non est ens simpliciter, sed secundum quid et quodammodo», 
ibid., pp. 149-150.
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tude concerning accidents, thanks chiefly to the modi rerum. The basic antire-
alist attitude of both positions could make the appraisal of such a philosoph-
ical divergence a knotty question, but I think that we have enough evidence 
either of the polemical use of modi rerum or of the polemical target itself.
2. A very similar distinction is to be found in a passage from John 
Buridan's commentary on the Analitica priora, where he records the different 
meanings  proposed for  the proposition «hominem bibere vinum».  What  I 
have labelled as  modi rerum theory corresponds to the second position, for 
which the meaning of the proposition is identified with a complexe significabi-
le23. An authoritative witness about the close relationship between complexe si-
gnificabile and  modus rei comes from Albert of Saxony's commentary on the 
Physics, in a passage of the 3rd question of the third book («Utrum figura sit 
res  distincta a  re  figurata»)24,  where he points  out  that  in his  time it  was 
customary to refer to modus rei as to complexe significabile.
Complexe significabile, however, can not be considered the only possible 
source for the modi rerum. In the 6th question on the fourth book («Utrum lo-
23 «Aliqui dicunt quod hoc non est nisi una propositio ita quod haec oratio ‘hominem bi-
bere vinum’ supponit pro illa propositione ‘homo bibit vinum’. Alii dicunt: ‘hominem 
bibere vinum’ est quoddam significabile complexum correspondens ex parte rei huic 
corruptibili propositioni ‘homo bibit vinum’. Et alii dicunt quod ‘hominem bibere vi-
num’ non est aliud quam homo taliter se habens ad vinum. Alii autem dicunt quod est 
quoddam accidens inhaerens homini ut taliter se habeat ad vinum», MARIA E. REINA, Il  
problema del linguaggio in Buridano. II. Significazione e verità, «Rivista critica di storia della 
filosofia» XV, 1960, pp. 141-166: pp. 160-161, n. 18. See also NUCHELMANS , Theories of the  
Propositions,  cit.,  p.  248.  This  corrects  what  I  have  wrongly  assumed in  my  article, 
CAROTI, Oresme on Motion, cit., p. 338.
24 «Esse figuratum et figuratum non sunt res distinctae, saltem sicut substantia et substan-
tia, vel sicut accidens et accidens, vel sicut accidens et substantia, quamvis forte bene 
posset sustineri quod distinguerentur sicut res et modus rei, quem quidem modum rei 
nunc temporis vocamus significabile complexe»,  BENOIT PATAR,  Expositio et Quaestiones  
in Aristotelis «Physicam» ad Albertum de Saxonia attributae, Louvain-La-Neuve, Louvain, 
Paris, Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Editions Peters 1999 (Philosophes 
Médiévaux, XL), p. 317. 
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cus sit  spatium interceptum inter  latera continentis,  quod esset vacuum si 
non esset ibi locatum»)25, before replying to a list of  dubia, the first of which 
concerns the ontology of place, Oresme reminds the different meanings of the 
term 'ens'. In this context he mentions only two of them: the former which can 
be expressed through absolute or connotative terms, complexe or incomplexe si-
gnificabilia or  with  other  categorematic  terms,  the  latter  through  sin-
cathegorematic terms, like the adverbs 'ubi'  or 'ibi'26.  Following this distinc-
tion, one seems entitled to agree with the theory according to which 'locus' is 
nothing, because it can be considered neither a substance nor an accident, for 
being expressed  proprissime through an adverb such as 'hic' or 'ibi'. Oresme, 
however, conforms himself to the received opinion for which place is some-
thing, defining this something as an aliqua conditio27.
25 ORESME, Questiones super Physicam, cit., pp. 456-464.
26 «Pro solutione primorum argumentorum notandum <est> quod ‘ens’ dicitur multiplici-
ter, ut patet primo huius, et ad propositum dupliciter: uno modo pro eo quod potest no-
minaliter significari sive absolute sive connotative, sive complexe sive incomplexe, sicut  
‘homo’, ‘album’, ‘albedo’ etc. et per pronomen demonstrativum significari dicendo ‘hoc’ 
vel ‘illud’ vel per reciprocum vel per relativum identitatis aut diversitatis, dicendo ‘ip-
sum’, ‘aliud’, ‘idem’, ‘diversum’ etc. Et tale dicitur substantia, sicut materia aut forma 
aut compositum; vel etiam accidens, sicut forma accidentalis vel condicio rei vel taliter 
se habere vel quocumque <modo> (I shall come back later on this identification bet-
ween accidens and conditio, which is another term for modus rei). Sed alio modo dicitur 
‘aliquid’ valde large, quod non est significabile per nomen nec demonstrabile <per> 
pronomen […], nec complexe nec incomplexe, sed solum syncategorematice per adver-
bia, sicut demonstrando ‘hic’ vel ‘ibi’», ibid., p. 461; see also  ZÉNON KALUZA, L'oeuvre 
théologique de Richard Brinkley O.F.M,  «Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du 
Moyen Age» LVI, 1989, pp. 202, ff., 240-243, 272, n. 77.
27 «Secundo, sciendum quod pro veritatibus habendis licitum est fingere ista esse entia 
[…]. Et ideo talia possunt appellari nominaliter, dicendo ‘locus’, ‘vacuum’ etc.; et minus 
<im>proprie in obliquo, dicendo ‘in loco’; et propriissime adverbialiter, dicendo ‘hic’ 
vel ‘ibi’. Ex hoc sequitur <tertio> quod aliqualiter bene dictum est quod locus nihil est, 
quia nulla res est locus, nec substantia nec accidens, sed quia videtur universaliter nega-
ri, ideo non bene sonat, quia non est sicut chimera aut hircocervus. Immo potest synca-
tegorematice significari et assignari, et etiam esse in loco vel esse alicubi est aliqua con-
dicio, et ad hoc movetur res naturaliter, ut sit hic vel ibi. Ideo melius est dicere quod est 
spatium», ORESME, Questiones super Physicam, cit., pp. 461-462. Oresme seems more hesi-
tant in replying to the dubium in which it is asked whether place is a substance or an ac-
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In this context we can find only some more ore less clear allusions to the 
connection between syncategorematic terms and modus rei (Oresme uses here 
condicio); we must be grateful again to Albert of Saxony, who in his comment-
ary on the Ars vetus, confirms openly this connection (and even that between 
modus rei and complexe significabile)28.
Another possible source of Oresme's modi rerum theory can be traced in 
the discussions about relations; it is Oresme himself to prompt this hypothes-
is, when in the 11th questio of the first book («Utrum in qualibet specie sit dare 
maximum naturale»)29 he proposes a fourfold destinction among natural be-
ings, where relationes and accidentia insensibilia, the most imperfect beings, are 
cident, even though he uses again the term condicio: «Tunc ad primam, cum queritur: 
‘vel substantia etc.’, dico quod non est substantia nec accidens, nec est aliquid proprie, 
sed est illud quod denotatur <per> ‘hic’  vel  ‘ibi’;  tamen melius posset  dici  accidens 
quam substantia, et forte est illud quod intelligitur per predicamentum ‘ubi’. Et cum di-
citur: ‘omne accidens est in subiecto’, dico quod ista condicio que est ‘esse in loco’ bene 
est in subiecto, et est accidens, vel per predicationem vel per inherentiam, quia accidit 
rei quod sit in tali loco vel hic vel ibi; tamen illud quod denotatur <per> ‘hic’ vel ‘ibi’  
non est in aliquo, sed aliquid est in illo. Et ita forte diceretur de tempore, quia hoc non 
est accidens inherens», ibid, p. 462. In the 17th question of the fourth book («Utrum tem-
pus sit ab anima», ibid., pp. 535-541. Oresme has a similar attitude concerning time: «Ad 
primum, potest concedi quod est accidens non inherens, sicut una forma, sed illud quod 
significatur per predicamentum ‘quando’ et sua inferiora, que sunt adverbia temporis. 
Ideo dicit<ur> quod heri est aliquando et hodie est aliquando; et non sequitur, ergo est 
aliqua res. Et propter hoc Aristoteles non nominavit talia predicata per nomina nec vo-
cavit ea ‘res’ nec ‘ens’ etc. Bene tamen conceditur quod accidit rei esse in tali tempore, et 
ideo esse tunc est accidens rei», ibid., p. 540.
28 «Syncathegoremata non significant aliquam rem quae sit substantia vel accidens, sed 
bene significant  modum rei,  quod ab aliis  vocatur significabile complexe.  Patet  hoc, 
nam praedicatum verificari de quolibet contento sub subiecto vel removeri a quolibet 
contento sub subiecto non est aliqua res que sit substantia vel accidens sed bene est mo-
dus rei et dispositio, puta subiecti vel praedicati; et sic syncathegoremata bene signifi-
cant aliquid, prout aliquid non solum significat existentiam rei, sed etiam modum rei», 
ANGEL MUÑOZ GARCIA, Alberti  de Saxonia Quaestiones in Artem Veterem. Edicion critica, 
Maracaibo,  Universidad  del  Zulia  1988,  p.  500,  see  also  pp.  71  and  82-83.  See  also 
NUCHELMANS,  Theories of the Propositions, cit.,  pp. 240-2;  HENRICUS A.G.  BRAAKHUIS,  De 
13de Eeuwse Tractaten over Syncategorematische Termen,  Nijmegen, Krips Repro Meppel 
1981, pp. 488-489, n. 83.
29 ORESME, Questiones super Physicam, cit., pp. 78-86.
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labelled as modi rerum30.
3. The introduction of modi rerum is very often accompanied by the 
reference to the different meanings of the term 'ens'. To better appreciate the 
role of the modi rerum as far as Oresme's ontology is concerned, the most sig-
nificant of these references is the fourfold scheme which follows the above 
mentioned three conclusions on  privatio.  The first and the most proper de-
notation of  'ens,  is  the  particular  existing  being,  followed by the  different 
parts of the same being (Oresme refers to them as to essentia), in which albedo, 
that is an accident in the category of quality, is included only to pay lip ser-
vice to the common opinion (secundum comunem viam). The last two meanings 
are the weaker, and both are presented either as complexe significabilia or con-
diciones:  the former refers to what can be expressed in an affermative pro-
position like 'Sor currere'; the latter to what can be expressed through a copu-
lative proposition, one part of which is affirmative the other negative, like in 
30 «Dicendum quod res naturales sunt in quadruplici differentia quantum ad propositum 
[…]. Quedam enim sunt multo imperfecta, sicut relationes seu accidentia insensibilia; et 
ideo aliqui dicunt quod non sunt nisi modi rerum, et alii quod non sunt nisi res ita se 
habentes (the distinction between taliter esse and ens taliter se habens is used here again), 
et ita denominant<ur>, sicut proportio et equalitas etc., que non sunt sensibilia nisi per 
accidens. Alia sunt minus imperfecta et communiter dicuntur forme accidentales seu 
qualitates sensibiles,  cuiusmodi sunt caliditas,  frigiditas et  consequentia formas sub-
stantiales. Sed alie sunt res <magis> perfecte sicut elementa et mixta que dicuntur im-
perfecta, et quedam mixta inanimata. Et alia sunt perfectiora, sicut sunt res animate etc. 
ut homo, bos etc.», ibid., p. 79. In the 16th question on the first book («Utrum privatio sit 
principium  distinctum  a  materia»,  ibid.,  pp.  119-126)  Oresme  seems  to  distinguish 
between accidents and relations: «Multi sunt gradus entis, et aliquod illorum membro-
rum potest subdividi. Sunt enim quedam condiciones rerum affirmative significabiles et 
duplices <sunt>, quia quedam sunt absolute et per se acquisibiles per motum, sicut est 
albedo vel esse album, et sic de aliis ; alie sunt relative, sicut similitudo, equalitas, que 
sunt acquisibiles per motum non per se, sed consecutive <et> per accidens, sicut patet 
quinto huius. Et illarum quedam sunt respectu presentis, sicut paternitas; alie respectu 
futuri, sicut potentia. Et ideo quedam est potentia coniuncta actui, qua materia potest 
stare cum forma; et alia est separata, qua potest recipere formam, de qua dicit Commen-
tator quod corrumpitur in adventu forme», ibid., pp. 119-120.
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'Sor posse moveri et non moveri'. Oresme mentions finally a pure negative 
condition, expressed through a negative proposition31.
Only  the  existing  particular  being can  be  regarded  as  an  ens in  the 
fullest sense, while the pure negative condition is simpliciter non ens, and only 
with some qualification an  ens32; all the rest can be regarded for certain as-
pects as being and for others as not-being, the components of the particular 
existing  beings  included33.  In  commenting  this  fourfold  distinction  of  the 
meaning of 'ens' Oresme is less hesitant concerning the ontological status of 
accidents:  instead of  including them in the second distinction (that  of  the 
parts of the existing particular beings) he degrades them to the third one34.
31 «Pro isto est una distinctio quod ‘ens’ dicitur multipliciter et equivoce, sicut patet primo 
huius, et ideo impossibile est investigare veritatem qui ymaginatur ‘ens’ dici uno modo. 
Ad propositum potest esse divisio talis: quod uno modo accipitur ‘ens’ pro aliquo per se 
existente, <ut> individuum demonstratum, et sic totum de genere substantie est ens, si-
cut Sor; et hoc quia habet operationem proprie. Secundo modo, accipitur ‘ens’ pro es-
sentia aliqua, sicut pro parte substantie vel forma <accidentali>; et sic dicuntur esse ma-
teria, forma <substantialis>, manus et albedo secundum comunem viam. Et iste modus 
potest subdividi. Tertio, capitur pro significabili complexe, sicut pro condicione affirma-
tiva, sicut est Sortem currere. Quarto, pro condicione quasi hypotetica significabili affir-
mative et negative; verbi gratia Sor posse moveri et non moveri est quedam condicio 
que dicitur quies; et omnis privatio continetur sub isto modo. Ulterius posset largius ex-
tendi ad condicionem mere negativam <sicut Sor> non currere’ vel intelligentiam non 
movere», ibid., p. 116.
32  Infra, n. 33.
33 «Tunc notandum est quod illud quod dicitur <ens> primo modo dicitur simpliciter ens 
et nullo modo non ens, sicut Sor. Et illud pro ultimo modo e converso dicitur non ens 
simpliciter et nullo modo ens, sed omnia intermedia dicuntur quodammodo esse, quo-
dammodo non esse. Et ne videatur fictum, probo per Aristotelem. Primo de materia, si-
cut de parte expresse patet primo huius, quod materia dicitur non ens per accidens. Ite-
rum, septimo Metaphysice quod materia non est <substantia> nec forma, sed totum com-
positum. Item, <in> De sensu dicitur quod partes non sunt in toto nisi in potentia, et ita 
dicuntur quodammodo non esse. Item, primo Politice probatur quod pars in toto dicitur 
non esse, quia unumquodque quod est habet propriam operationem distinctam a toto; 
unde oculus non videt proprie, sed homo videt per oculum», ORESME,  Questiones super  
Physicam, cit., pp. 116-117.
34 «De tertio, scilicet de condicione affirmativa, sicut sunt accidentia, patet expresse primo 
huius, ubi dicitur quod accidens est ens secundum quid, et substantia simpliciter; et sep-
timo Metaphysice, ubi dicitur quod accidens non est ens nisi quia entis», ibid., p. 117.
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3.1 Oresme's decision of reducing accidents in rank is not an isolated 
instance in his commentary on the Physics: in the 5th questio of the first book, 
from which the threefold distinction of the meaning of the term 'accidens' has 
been already quoted35, he proposes, with some hesitation36 a drastic reduction 
of the ten Aristotelian categories to the only one of substance37. In the second 
conclusion of  the second part  of  the question,  where Oresme presents his 
solution, he states «probabiliter et cum correctione» that according to Aris-
totle  an  accident  can  not  be  considered  a  form,  referring  himself  to  the 
threefold distinction of the meaning of accidens I have previously quoted38. He 
corroborates this statement with some arguments where he emphasizes either 
the difference between substance and accidents, which have no natural like-
ness, or the untenable consequences of a different solution as far as relations, 
or terms like angulus and figura are concerned. 
35 Supra, n. 8.
36 «Sed quantum ad secundum, scilicet an substantia et accidens sint nata significare equi-
voce, oporteret scire quid est proprie substantia et accidens. Et sicut dicit Commentator 
secundo Metaphysice commento sexto, "ista questio fuit desiderata ab omnibus antiquis, 
et est difficilis valde". Item dicit Commentator secundo Metaphysice commento secundo: 
"non solum oportet reddere gratias eis qui conveniunt nobiscum in opinionibus, sed 
etiam aliis qui disconveniunt, quia tales exercitaverunt intellectum nostrum et fecerunt 
acquirere virtutem ad aprehendendum veritatem" . Hoc dico pro tanto, quia in ista que-
stione difficili volui gratia exercitii discedere ab opinionibus aliorum, non asserens quod 
opinio sequens sit vera, sed cum correctione aliorum», ORESME,  Questiones super Physi-
cam, cit., p. 34.
37 This reduction relies upon the analogy of the term ‘ens’ when referred either to sub-
stance or to accident;  here Oresme insists in quoting the seventh book of Aristotle’s 
Metaphisics and Averroe’s commentary on the same, a source used also in the fourfold 
distinction mentioned in n. 33, and in other contexts in order to stress the difference 
between the first and the remaining categories: «Prima (scil.: conclusio) est ista: quod 
‘ens’ dicitur equivoce de substantia et accidente, capiendo ‘equivocum’ secundo modo 
pro analogo, ita quod proprie et vere dicitur de substantia, secund<ari>o de accidente. 
Probatur <primo>, quia illud equivoce dicitur de accidente, quod non dicitur de eo se-
cundum propriam rationem, id est descriptionem vel definitionem propriam quid no-
minis, patet ex quarta propositione; sed ens est huius<modi> respectu accidentis, quia, 
si queratur quid est vere ens, respondetur quod est substantia», ibid., p. 35.
38 Supra, n. 8.
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The first conclusion ends with a critical reference to a not better quali-
fied glossa occamica, which is the first explicit allusion to an Ockhamist posi-
tion in Oresme's commentary on the Physics. This reference is very important 
because, even if the topic mentioned here seems marginal to the discussion, it 
follows a remark where Oresme maintains that the term 'ens' «non significat 
ad placitum sed ex natura rei»39. We can find, as we shall see later, the same 
remark when Oresme attacks the new rules proposed for the dictio exclusiva 
by Ockham in the 8th question on the first book.
From  the  examples  quoted  in  this  context  it  seems  that  Oresme  is 
particularly eager to refuse to accidents in the category of quality a special 
condition: introducing a possible reply about relations and the terms angulus 
and figura, which could be considered «substantia sic se habens», he proposes 
to extend such solution to all the accidents and notably to albedo40. That qual-
39 «Tertio, sic: si ‘ens’ esset univocum, sequitur quod non esset nisi unum predicamentum, 
quia pari ratione qua animal est genus ad hominem et equum et predicatur de eis in 
quid, ita ens esset genus substantie et accidentis et predicaretur in quid de eis. Nec valet 
si dicatur quod predicamenta sunt voluntarie instituta, quia in omni idiomate, tam gre-
co quam latino, assignantur decem predicamenta et tot modi significandi non conve-
nientes in aliquo communi; et ideo signum est quod hoc nomen ‘ens’ non significat ad 
placitum, sed ex natura rei. Et ideo dicebat Porphirius quod “si quis omnia ‘entia’ vocet, 
equivoce nuncupabit”. Nec valet glosa occamica qua diceretur quod ‘ens’ dicitur equi-
voce de multitudine collectiva et de re una, quia manifestum est quod hoc non est ad in-
tentionem Porphirii nec Aristotelis;  et pari ratione ‘homo’ diceretur equivocum, quia 
participatione multitudinis, quod non est», ibid., pp. 35-36.
40 «Secunda conclusio est ista, quam dico probabiliter et cum correctione: et est quod de 
intentione Philosophi videtur quod nullum accidens est forma seu essentia secundum 
primam viam expositam in notabili sive primum modum. Hoc probatur primo, quia se-
quitur quod ‘ens’ esset univocum contra primam conclusionem, quia sequitur quod for-
ma ita diceretur de substantiali et accidentali propter naturalem similitudinem et conve-
nientiam, quia utraque consimiliter informaret, licet una de prope etc. Etiam forma <ac-
cidentalis> esset vere ens, ut vide<bi>tur, si quis cogitet. Secundo, sequitur, ut videtur, 
quod tale accidens, ut albedo, secundum quod ymaginatur, esset substantia, quia pro-
prie significaretur nomine subiectivo et esset vera essentia. Et si dicatur quod non, quia 
ad corruptionem eius non corrumpitur individuum subiectum, sicut ad corruptionem 
forme substantialis, ut anime, hoc non sufficit, quia aliquando corrumpitur aliqua sub-
stantia in aliquo individuo, et tamen illud non corrumpitur, sicut pars Sor removetur 
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ity is no exception is explicitly confirmed by Oresme in the following conclu-
sion41: contrary to what he maintains either in his discussion about privatio or 
in that about motion, Oresme is here less reluctant toward the res sic se habens, 
and seems to propose an extension of this semantical device also to the cat-
egory of quality. The res sic se habens, however, is not Oresme's own solution, 
which is to be found in the last conclusion, where he considers accidents modi 
of the substance, even though he does not use here the term 'modi rerum'. This 
solution is granted by refusing to accidents the possibility to be expressed 
properly by a substantive term: they are in fact properly expressed by an in-
finitive with an adjective which permits to locate them inside the Aristotelian 
categories:  «aliquid  tantum  esse»,  «aliquid  tale  esse»,  «aliquid  ad  aliquid 
esse»42. 
3.2 The discussion about the denotation of the three Aristotelian prin-
ciples of change, materia, forma and privatio is very important for at least two 
reasons: a) we can meet here with an explicit reference to modi or condiciones  
manente Sorte. Item, substantia dicitur <a> per se stare: vel igitur intelligitur ‘per se’, id 
est ‘solitarie’, et ita nec forma nec etiam materia esset substantia; vel ‘per se’, id est ‘vere 
ens’, et tunc sequeretur quod albedo esset vera substantia. Ultimo, si poneretur quod 
accidens esset talis forma extensa et divisibilis etc., tunc multa sunt quibus impossibile 
esset assignare subiectum adequatum, sicut relationes, angulus et figura etc. Et si dicis 
quod talia non sunt nisi substantia sic se habens, tunc per eandem rationem dicerem de 
albedine et de quolibet accidente», ibid., p. 36.
41 «Tertia  conclusio  […] est  ista:  quod nullum accidens est  substantia  nec  qualitas  nec 
quantitas nec relatio etc […]. Nec valet dicere quod qualitas distinguitur a substantia, et 
quantitas non vel relatio, quia omni modo per hoc per quod solvuntur rationes proban-
tes quantitatem distingui, solvuntur de qualitate, ut patet inducendo», ibid., p. 37.
42 «Ultima conclusio est quod omne accidens proprie loquendo est aut tantum esse aut 
tale esse aut ad aliquid <esse> aut aliquod tale, que non sunt significabilia proprie ali-
quo communi nec aliquo nomine substantivo. Et hoc dicit Aristoteles quasi in omnibus 
locis: ista predicata nominantur isto modo; et in libro Physicorum et undique. <Probatur 
primo>, quia ponatur quod Sor currat, tunc illud accidens quod est cursus Sortis, vel est 
quedam forma et essentia inherens, et hoc est falsum per secundam conclusionem, vel  
est ipse Sor sic se habens, et hoc est falsum per tertiam […], vel est idem quod est Sor  
currere, et habetur propositum», ibid., pp. 36-37. 
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rerum; b) Oresme's criticism against the second solution, which is not very far 
from  Oresme's  as  far  as  ontology  is  concerned  (privatio,  in  fact,  is  not 
something different from materia, as it is assumed in the first one) relies upon 
a terminist interpretation of this same position.
De tertio principali, qualiter sunt tria in transmutatione, triplex est modus di-
cendi.  Primus  est  quod sunt  tres  vere  res  vel  sunt  tria  vera  entia  distincta, 
videlicet materia et forma positiva et alia forma privativa; sed illud est contra 
Aristotelem, qui dicit in ultimo capitulo quod privatio est per se non ens; et di-
cit in sexto quod … materia et privatio faciunt unum numero. Secundus modus 
est quod sunt tria nomina seu tres termini, quorum unus significat ipsam for-
mam et alia duo subiectum, unum absolute, videlicet materiam, et <aliud> con-
notando privationem, scilicet carentia<m> forme, scilicet privatum <esse>. Et 
ideo solum sunt due res, sed sunt tres termini habentes definitiones distinctas 
exprimentes quid nominis, et per hoc glossantur auctoritates Aristotelis. Et hoc 
est quod ipse dicit, quod sunt duo numero, sed sunt tria ratione, id est definitio-
ne exprimente  quid nominis.  Contra illud arguitur:  quamvis  possit  sustineri 
probabiliter, tamen non est ad intentionem Aristotelis; immo videtur quodam-
modo absurdum, et videtur quedam derisio dicere quod tria nomina sunt tria 
principia rerum naturalium. Sed si dicatur quod non sunt principia, sed signifi-
cant principia, tunc ita bene principia significantur uno nomine, scilicet hoc no-
mine 'principium', aut etiam quinque nominibus scilicet 'materia' et 'potentia', 
'privatio', 'forma' et 'actus' et sic de aliis. Et ideo, licet responsio fit per nomina, 
tamen non est de nominibus nec est questio de nominibus, sed loco rerum uti-
mur nominibus, ut dicitur primo <capitulo> Elencorum … Tertius modus est, et 
suppono distinctionem quod hec nomina 'res', 'ens', 'unum' sunt equivoca. Patet 
per Aristotelem primo huius, ubi dicit quod antiqui erraverunt quia indistinxe-
runt ista nomina. Et ideo uno modo accipitur 'ens' pro aliqua re demonstrata 
vere existente, sicut est homo, animal et albedo secundum communem viam. 
Secundo modo, accipitur equivoce et large pro modo rei sive condicione, que 
proprie esset significabilis per orationem vel complexe43.
43 «Verbi gratia etas non est aliquid demonstratum sed est rem tantum durasse et fuisse a 
longo tempore, et sic de multis aliis rebus. Tunc ad propositum <dicitur> quod multo-
tiens talia enuntiantur cum re<rum nomini>bus ; verbi gratia, si queratur quid requiri-
tur ad hoc quod aliqua debeat desponsari regi, responditur quod quattuor, scilicet: sa-
pientia, pulchritudo, nobilitas et etas et sic de aliis. Et iste sunt condiciones rerum. Ex 
quo patet solutio quod, cum dicitur: sunt tria principia, non est intelligendum quod 
sunt tria entia, sed solummodo duo et una condicio materie, scilicet materiam esse pri-
vatam, que dicitur ‘privatio’. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles capitulo quinto quod quadammo-
do sunt duo et quodammodo sunt tria», ibid., pp. 100-101. 
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Even though Oresme makes recourse in many contexts to connotation, it is 
evident from this long quotation that he prefers, and in some way opposes, to 
connotation his theory of modi or conditiones rerum. The only explanation that 
I can propose about this sort of opposition is that connotation seems, at least 
in this context, too narrowly connected with a terminist ontology (labelled 
here as «quedam derisio»), while modi rerum are able to assure a more reistic 
approach -- modus rei being something real and not linguistic -- without how-
ever maintaining that privatio is a res different from materia. If it is not too haz-
ardous to think that Oresme associates, even though not explicitly, this posi-
tion with Ockham's, his effort to reduce also quality to a modus rei could be 
viewed as a part of a wider philosophical strategy.
4. Some more evidence of either the polemical use of modi rerum or 
of Oresme's target is provided by the discussion on the object of knowledge 
(«quid est illud quod proprie est scitum»)44 in the 2nd  quaestio of the first book 
of  the  Physics  («Utrum  omne  scibile  habens  causas  sciatur  per  illas»)45. 
Oresme  deals  with  the  proper  object  of  science,  which  is  stated  to  be  a 
complexe significabile, in the second part of the  questio46. His solution is to be 
found  in  the  third  conclusion,  which  follows  the  first  two,  where  it  is 
44 Ibid., p. 9.
45 Ibid., pp. 8-14.
46 «Tunc dico de secundo principali, quomodo aliquid potest sciri.  Et pono aliquam di-
stinctionem quod aliquid sciri vel cognosci potest esse dupliciter: uno modo proprie, et 
isto modo scitum <est> complexe significabile, sicut ‘triangulum habere tres’. Secundo 
modo improprie, sed magis famose, et illud dicitur <imperfecte> sciri de quo sciuntur 
multe proprietates et condiciones […]. Tunc pono unam conclusionem, quod capiendo 
‘scire’ secundo modo, nulla res perfecte scitur sive cognoscitur. Probatur, quia sumpta 
aliqua re, ut puta adamante, forte sunt alique proprietates eius quas non scimus, et ita 
est de aliis rebus», ibid., p. 12. See STEFANO CAROTI, L'oggetto della conoscenza secondo Nico-
le Oresme ("Questiones super Physicam", I, 2), in LUIGI BORGIA, FRANCESCO DE LUCA, PAOLO 
VITI, RAFFAELLA MARIA ZACCARIA (eds.), Studi in onore di Arnaldo d'Addario, II, Lecce, Con-
te 1995, pp. 456-649.
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excluded that the object of science is either the uttered or written conclusion 
(concl. 1) or the mental one (concl. 2). Taking the relationship between the 
terms  'urina'  and  'sanus'  as  an  example,  Oresme  fixes  a  sort  of  hierarchy 
between  the  two  different  solutions  in  relation  to  science:  if  the  mental 
conclusion can be regarded as the object of science equivocally, because it is 
the natural sign of what is known, uttered and written conclusions seem to 
have  a  much  weaker  connection  with  the  object  of  science47.  Oresme  is 
probably  pointing  out  through  this  comparison  the  different  ways  of 
signifying of uttered and written propositions on one part, and mental ones 
on the other: the former are conventional signs of things, while the latter are 
natural  ones.  The  tree  last  arguments  of  the  second  conclusion48 prepare 
47 «De primo, supponendo quod capitur de scientia proprie dicta, sicut illa per quam sci-
tur triangulum habere tres. Tunc sit prima conclusio quod illud quod est proprie scitum 
non est conclusio vocalis vel scripta. Et si dicatur hec scita, <hoc> est equivoce magis 
quam urina dicitur esse sana […]. Secunda conclusio est quod nec mentalis propositio 
dicitur scita proprie, sed solum dicitur scita equivoce, quia est naturale signum rei scite,  
sicut urina dicitur sana equivoce, quia est naturale signum sanitatis»,  ORESME,  Questio-
nes super Physicam, cit., pp. 9-10. The first conclusion contains four arguments: «Probo 
sic: quia statim sequeretur quod addisceremus res per encaustum et pergamenum et vo-
ces; immo quod homo sciret parietem vel lapidem quando sciret unam conclusionem de 
geometria, et sic de aliis. Secundo, confirmatur: sequitur quod ille qui sciret triangulum 
habere tres et nihil sciret de geometria plus, quod sciret multas conclusiones, quia illa in 
multis locis est scripta, et quandoque plures et quando pauciores; et quod si destituere-
tur de libro, sciret pauciora quam ante. Tertio, confirmatur: sequitur quod surdus et mu-
tus non posset aliquid scire, scilicet <habere> cognitionem de geometria, quod est fal-
sum […]. Quarto, confirmatur: quia sequitur quod ille qui obliviscitur signa vocabulo-
rum obliviscitur sententiam suam, quod est falsum; sufficit enim scire sententiam. Ulti-
mo, quia nulla propositio talis dicitur proprie propositio, ideo non est scita nec scitur, ut 
patet, quia tunc eadem esset vera et falsa, et contradictoria essent simul vera, quia pos-
sibile est quod significet uni unum et alteri totum oppositum», ibid., pp. 9-10. 
48 The others are the following: «Probatur sic, quia, si esset verum, sequitur quod duo vel 
tres non possent idem scire, quod est impossibile et contra illud quod est communiter 
concessum. Et consequentia clara est, quia scitum a me esset conclusio mentalis de men-
te mea vel in anima mea, <et> cum ipsa non possit esse in anima alterius nec ei signifi-
care; sequitur quod non potest sciri ab aliquo alio. Secundo, confirmatur: idem non pos-
set esse opinatum et postea scitum, cuius oppositum conceditur. Consequentia tenet, 
quia non potest esse mutatio nisi in ipsa anima, <et> quia scitum est <in anima> semper 
eodem modo, ideo oportet  primo quod esset vera conclusio que esse<t> opinata,  et 
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Oresme's solution in the third one. He distinguishes neatly between the act of 
knowing  and  the  object  of  knowledge;  the  identification  of  the  mental 
conclusion, considered a natural sign of external beings, with the object of 
knowledge  compels,  according  to  Oresme,  to  introduce  an  additional 
understanding about the meaning of the mental sign,  which is considered 
superfluous  and  even  an  obstacle  to  science49.  That  of  which  the  mental 
proposition is a natural sign is viewed as the proper object of knowledge in 
the third conclusion:
obiectum scientie est illud quod proprie scitur et est taliter <esse> in re sicut 
quod lactuca sanat febrem50. 
The reply to the first dubium which relies upon the modal terms' function to 
modify propositions and not things, confirms that Oresme is resolute in dis-
postea <alia que> erit scita.  Et si  diceretur quod esset eadem, tunc oporteret ponere 
unam aliam opinionem in anima», ibid., p. 10.
49 «Tertio, conclusio universalis est scientia, ergo ipsa non est scita. Antecedens patet, quia 
non videtur ratio quare debeat poni in anima alia scientia quam sit ipsa conclusio; pro-
batur consequentia, quia videtur quod habitus distinguitur a<b> obiecto, sicut est de 
aliis habitibus, et modo scientia est habitus et obiectum dicitur esse scitum. Confirma-
tur, quia obiectum cognitionis incomplexe est aliud ab ipsa cognitione, ergo etiam ita 
erit de cognitione complexa. Quarto, sic: si conclusio esset scita, sequitur quod homo 
sciret eam significare sic, et quod est ita sicut significat, et tunc rusticus non posset addi-
scere geometriam vel aliam scientiam, quia ipse nescit quod propositiones mentales ali-
quid significent nec quod sint», ibid. The last argument is per auctoritatem: «Ultimo, con-
cordant omnes auctoritates, que dicunt quod scire est rem cognoscere et non propositio-
nem mentalem», ibid., p. 11.
50 Ibid. «Et probatur, quia illud est scitum de quo proprie respondetur quando queritur 
‘quid scitur?’; et modo sic est tale, ut apparet per experientiam. Secundo, confirmatur 
sic: quorumcumque est notitia incomplexa et simplex, eorundem est notitia complexa 
postea et composita; patet statim per Aristotelem tertio De anima. Sed res extra cogno-
scuntur cognitione simplici, ergo ipsemet sunt scite et cognite cognitione complexa. Ter-
tio, confirmatur: illud proprie est scitum quod habet causas expressas in demonstratio-
ne, sicut patet per Aristotelem; sed hoc non est propositio mentalis, sicut illa ‘lactuca sa-
nat febrem’, ymmo res extra, ut notum est», ibid.
20
tinguishing between propositions as signs and what they are signs of51.
Oresme's discussion is very concise not to say compressed, and even 
though his fixing in the res extra the proper object of knowledge does not rise 
problems, it is not clear if what is referred to by the proposition is either a res 
or a state of affairs. From the above quoted passages -- and above all from the 
opposition between taliter esse and res taliter se habens -- one is entitled to solve 
this problem granting the latter hypothesis. As we have seen, this solution 
does not postulate a new special being (in the case of accidents in the cat-
egory of quality it is even more reductionist than Ockham's position), and at 
the same time permits to avoid possible misunderstandings occasioned by 
the distinction between absolute and connotative terms, which, according to 
Oresme, could probably foster a terminist point of view. I think, however, that 
it is very difficult to solve this problem, because Oresme does not seem to be 
very concerned about semantical problems, habitually tackled in the discus-
sions on the object of scientific knowledge. 
We can however maintain that in Oresme's ontology only particular ex-
isting beings are granted, as clearly stressed also in this context. One could 
wonder if Oresme resorts to the formula 'taliter esse sicut significatur per pro-
positionem', which in other contexts is openly identified with a  complexe si-
gnificabile, drawing his inspiration from the discussions about the meaning of 
the proposition. Even though this is highly probable, the scanty allusions do 
51 «Sed contra hoc dubitatur, quia ‘scitum’, ‘opinatum’ et sic de aliis faciunt propositiones 
modales, ergo habent determinare propositionem et non rem extra, sicut dicimus quod 
res non est contingens vel possibilis, sed propositio est contingens; et ita debet dici quod 
est scientia […]. Ad primum, dico quod licet ‘scitum’, ‘opinatum’ et sic de aliis dicantur 
determinare propositiones, <tamen dico> quod proprie est pro significatis propositio-
num; et ideo dico quod sic esse in re est scitum, ita quod ly ‘scitum’ determinat quan-
dam compositionem que est in re extra. Et ita dicerem de contingenti et necessario, quia 
Deum esse erat necessarium antequam mundus esset vel aliqua propostio», ibid.
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not permit to identify with more precision Oresme's sources, preventing to 
better  appreciate  his  convictions  in  the  historical  context  of  the  Parisian 
debates in the midst of the fourteenth century.
Oresme's main target, in any case, is evidently a terminist conception of 
scientific knowledge. In order to avoid such a danger, he is even ready to con-
sider the 'triangulum habere tres' an accident in the category of quality, in the 
reply to the third  dubium following the above mentioned conclusions. This 
dubium is very interesting because it contains an allusion to the ontology of 
the expression 'triangulum habere tres', which is considered purely nothing52. 
The identification of 'triangulum habere tres' with an accident in the category 
of  quality  is,  moreover,  a  very  astute  move;  reminding  that  according  to 
Oresme all accidents are  modi  or  condiciones rerum which can be expressed 
through a  complexe significabile, this identification could be considered as an 
anticipation of what will be defended in the 5th questio, rather than the admis-
sion of a category different from that of substance.
5. Even in his effort to reduce all Aristotelian categories to substance 
and modi or condiciones of the substance itself, and particularly the accidents 
in the category of quality, Oresme is very severe against what he holds to be a 
52 «Tertio, capio illud ‘triangulum habere tres’. Vel illud est idem quod triangulus, et tunc 
sequitur quod quicumque scit triangulum sciat ipsum habere tres, quod est falsum; sed 
si sit aliquid aliud, ut videtur, quia non est accidens nec aliquid tale, ergo tale non sci-
tur», ibid.. In the first reply to this dubium Oresme makes recourse to the vis confundendi 
of the verb ‘scire’ to avoid that knowing the term ‘triangulus’ one knows also that it has 
three angles: «Ad tertium, potest dici uno modo quod triangulus est ‘triangulum habere 
tres’; et ideo si Sor sci<r>et triangulum et igno<ra>ret ipsum habere tres, tunc concede-
retur <quod> ‘triangulum habere tres’ est scitum a Sorte, nec plus posset haberi per 
quamcumque formam syllogismi expositorii. Sed illa negaretur quod Sor sciret ‘triangu-
lum habere tres’ a parte predicati»,  ibid.,  p. 12. The second reply: «Aliter posset dici 
quod ‘triangulum habere tres’ est accidens trianguli de genere qualitatis. Sic igitur con-
cludeendo  tenendum  est  quod  est  aliqua  scientia  de  rebus  et  realiter  et  non  de 
terminis»” ibid.
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terminist position. On the basis of some allusions to a terminist point of view 
by the defenders of accidents in the category of quality53 we could infere that 
in this case, like in the discussion concerning the object of scientific know-
ledge, Oresme's implicit target is William Ockham or some of his unnamed 
followers. Although it can not be ruled out, I think that the evidence is rather 
scanty, considering, moreover, that the attribution of albedo to the category of 
quality is labelled by Oresme as «communis via». 
There is however an explicit polemical allusion to Ockham in the 8th 
question of the first book («Utrum hec sit vera: ‘tantum unum est’»)54, which 
might shed light on Oresme's attitude toward Ockham. In this rather technic-
al context, the explicit criticism against Ockham refers to his supposed con-
viction that «homo imponit nomina ad placitum»55.  In this general censure 
53 Supra, n. 39.
54 ORESME,  Questiones super Physicam, cit., pp. 56-61. On this topic see  S. EBBESEN (1995). 
Tantum unum est.  13th  Century Sophismatic  Discussions around the  Parmenidean Thesis , 
«The Modern Schoolman» LXXII, 1995, pp. 175-199.
55 This objection in introduced in the discussion about the expositio of exclusive proposi-
tions, in which terms like ‘unus’ or ‘alter’ are added: «Secunda suppositio est quod que-
dam sunt nomina sive dictiones consignificantia indistinctionem seu privationem multi-
tudinis, sicut hoc nomen ‘unum’, ut patet quinto Metaphysice, et ‘unicum’, et quedam si-
gna particularia, sicut ‘alter’ et ‘alterum’, et alia sunt que non significant taliter, sicut 
‘ens’ et ‘homo’. Tunc sit prima conclusio quod si dictio exclusiva addatur primis nomi-
nibus, debet exponi ut patet in hoc exemplo: ‘tantum unus homo albus est’, id est unus 
homo est albus, et nullus alius ab isto est albus. Ex quo patet statim quod ista est falsa, 
si plures sint albi. Hoc probatur, sicut talia sunt probanda, scilicet per testimonium com-
mune, quia illa est falsa de virtute sermonis que est falsa secundum communem opinio-
nem hominum; sed ista est huiusmodi, <ergo> etc. Maior apparet ex prima suppositio-
ne, et minor est nota per se […]. Secunda conclusio est quod si <dictio exclusiva> aliis 
<nominibus> addatur, debet sic exponi: ‘tantum homo est albus’, id est homo est albus, 
et nihil est album nisi homo aut pars sui. Probatur, quia, si exponeretur aliter, sicut di-
cunt alii, tunc i<s>ta esset impossibilis, quia aliquid aliud (in marg.: opinio Ocham) ab 
homine est album, scilicet pars eius; sed ubi predicatum inest toti et non partibus, suffi-
cit dicere: ‘nihil est album quod non sit homo’ vel ‘nihil est tale quod non sit homo’, si-
cut in ista: ‘tantum homo est risibilis’. Et ideo convertitur in universalem de terminis 
transpositis. Ex quo sequitur corollarie contra aliquos quod dictio exclusiva potest addi 
termino  numerali,  sicut:  ‘tantum  tres  currunt’  et  nomini  collectivo  et  toti  integrali 
respectu cuiusdam predicamenti,  et  quod omnes tales  si<n>t  possibiles,  nisi  aliquid 
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more precise charges against Ockahm's view on exclusive propositions are 
summarized;  from  the  examples  Oresme  quotes  we  can  find  a  common 
element: all the exclusive propositions we find in both Oresme's commentary 
and Ockham's Summa Logicae refer to the passages where Ockham deals with 
an improper acception of the dictio exclusiva56.
impediat,  sicut:  ‘tantum  homo  est  albus’,  et  sic  de  aliis»,  ORESME,  Questiones  super  
Physicam, cit., pp. 56-57.
56 As far as ‘tantum homo est albus’ of the quotation in the preceding footnote, see GUILLELMI 
DE OCKHAM, Summa logicae, ed. by Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gál, and Stephen Brown, 
St. Bonaventure N.Y., The Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University 1974 (Opera 
philosophica et theologica, I), pp. 299, 90 ff. The text of Oresme’s explicit criticism against 
Ockham is the following: «Ex hoc iterum sequitur quod, si ponantur alique alie exposi-
tiones et etiam alie regule, sicut ponit Ocham (in marg.: opinio Ocham), ipse sunt vere, 
supposito quod homo imponat nomina ad placitum, sicut si poneretur quod ‘tantum’ 
excludet solummodo homines, tunc posset facere alias regulas. Item probo quod non ex-
ponatur sicut ipse dicit, et hoc semper, quia, posito quod non essent nisi duo homines 
solum, tunc secundum expositionem suam ista  esset  vera:  ‘tantum alter  illorum est 
homo’, et tamen uterque illorum est homo, quia exponentes essent vere, scilicet: ‘alter il-
lorum est homo et nihil aliud quod non sit alter illorum est homo’; et quod ipsa sit falsa 
patet per expositionem, quia numquam concederetur ab aliquo. Iterum, contra eum est 
aliud corollarium: quod <ex> maiori universali affirmativa et minori exclusiva conclu-
ditur particulariter in prima figura. Verbi gratia: ‘omnis homo est substantia, tantum 
animal est homo, ergo quoddam animal est substantia’. Potest probari, quia minor con-
vertitur in universalem affirmativam, et tunc est primus modus tertie figure; et potest 
probari per regulam primo Priorum: quidquid sequitur ad consequens, sequitur ad ante-
cedens», ORESME, Questiones super Physicam, cit., pp. 57-58. The reference to the particu-
lar use of ‘tantum’ limited only to men is to: «Iuxta tertiam -- impropriam -- acceptio-
nem dictionis exclusivae potest accipi tertia regula ista, quod quando dictio exclusiva 
additur termino universali sive aequivalenti, vel connotanti numerum vel unitatem, illa 
propositio est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse exclusio proprie vel improprie. Primo 
modo excluditur omne illud de quo non verificatur subiectum; secundo modo excludi-
tur maior pluralitas quam illa cui denotatur praedicatum competere; et potest vocari ex-
clusio maioris pluralitatis. Et secundum hoc ista propositio est distinguenda ‘tantum 
quatuor homines sunt hic intus’, quia supponatur quod quatuor homines sunt hic intus 
et non plures, tunc si fiat exclusio proprie accipiendo dictionem exclusivam, denotatur 
quod quatuor homines sunt hic intus, et per consequens quod lapides non sunt hic in-
tus, et quod equi non sunt hic intus, nec asini, nec quod duo homines sunt hic intus, 
quia duo homines sunt alii a quatuor hominibus. Si autem fiat exclusio maioris plurali-
tatis, tunc denotatur quod quatuor homines sunt hic intus et non plures quam quatuor. 
Et tunc sunt istae eius exponentes ‘quatuor homines sunt hic intus, et ‘non sunt plures 
homines hic intus quam quatuor; et sic est vera, posito priori casu», OCKHAM, Summa lo-
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I have quoted integrally in the footnotes the passages from Ockham's 
Summa Logicae which Oresme has in mind, because I think that a thorough 
confrontation between Ockham's text and Oresme's charges can bring to light 
what  we  could  define  Oresme's  preconceived  attitude  toward  Ockham.  I 
mean that in his discussion about exclusive propositions Oresme's decision to 
attack Ockham rests more on Ockham's distinction between a proper and im-
proper acception of dictio exclusiva than on particular doctrinal interpretations 
or technical solutions as far as the exclusive propositions are concerned.  I 
should like to add that Oresme's too concise references in order to substanti-
ate his allegations, shows that his own can be considered  ad hominem argu-
ments; the criticism according to which 'tantum' could refer only to men in 
order to save the new rules is really uncomprehensible outside the whole 
context, but obviously is  à propos for charging Ockham of maintaining that 
terms have been conventionally imposed. In few words I think that the reas-
on why Oresme has chosen this topic is grounded on Ockham's distinction 
between «primaria» and «secundaria institutio»57 rather than on doctrinal di-
vergences.
I think that such a hypothesis is prompted by the philosophical context 
of the discussion, whic is opened by a very eloquent suppositio in which the 
virtus sermonis is completely subordinate to the communis usus:
Prima suppositio est quod sermo non habet veritatem nisi ex usu loquentium, et 
gicae, cit. , p. 301, 137-155. As far as the example of the second passage: «Similiter est de 
ista ‘tantum alterum istorum est’, demonstrando duo entia; nam sumpta dictione exclu-
siva proprie, vera est, quia utraque exponens est vera, si non sunt plura quam illa duo, 
scilicet  Deus  et  angelus.  Si  sumatur  improprie,  falsa  est,  quia  tunc  denotatur  quod 
alterum istorum est et non utrumque», ibid., p. 302, 164-168.
57 OCKHAM,  Summa logicae, cit., pp. 297, 35; 298, 66. This obviously is not the only place 
where Ockham draws this distinction. 
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ideo illud dicitur verum de virtute sermonis quod est verum secundum com-
munem cursum, usum et acceptionem hominum, et etiam secundum materiam 
subiectam58.
This  suppositio,  expressed in terms that  echo a passage of  the well  known 
Parisian Statute of 134059, can help perhaps to give a more precise historical 
framework of Oresme's attack against Ockham or Ockham's followers. I shall 
not insist on this very important point, however, because to my knowledge 
the quoted passage is the only one that could be easily related to the Parisian 
Statute. I am here interested rather to investigate the possibility of establish-
ing a relationship between this open criticism of Ockham's position on a spe-
cific logical topic and the polemical use of the modi rerum in the above quoted 
or mentioned passages, in order to substantiate the impression that this same 
polemical use is part of a wider philosophical strategy.
The only element I can single out from the discussion on the exclusive 
propositions is  rather generic,  and is the remark that Ockham's new rules 
could be granted only by maintaining that «nomina sunt ad placitum institu-
ta». This remark has of course a precise role in the 8th question, if we consider 
the first suppositio, in which the virtus sermonis depends strictly on communis  
usus. I think nonetheless that the introduction of modi rerum to face a position 
interpreted  by  Oresme  as  supporting  a  terminist  point  of  view  can  be 
considered as a part of the wider strategy of defending the primacy of things 
on  signs,  as  clearly  ressorts  also  from  the  discussion  on  the  object  of 
knowledge.  The  modi  rerum seem able  to contrast  efficaciously a terminist 
58 ORESME, Questiones super Physicam, cit., p. 56.
59 JOHANNES M. M. H. THIJSSEN, Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris 1200-1400, Phil-
adelphia,  University of Pennsylvania Press 1998 (The Middle Age Series),  pp. 57-72; 
LUCA BIANCHI,  Censure  et  liberté  intellectuelle  à  l’Université  de  Paris  (XIIIe-XIVe sècles) , 
Paris, Les Belles Lettres 1999 (L’âne d’or), pp. 129-162.
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point of view, which could be regarded as encouraging a conventionalistic 
view of language.
Even not considering the weak relationship between Oresme's introduc-
tion of  modi rerum and the explicit criticism against Ockham in the 8th ques-
tion of the first book of the Physics60, I think nonetheless that some hints in the 
above quoted texts61 give some evidence either to such a polemical use or to 
the hypothesis that Ockham or Ockham's followers are the main target of this 
polemical use. If my hypothesis is not completely untenable, I think that it 
can be a modest, but not useless, contribution to a more documented apprais-
al of the philosophical debates at the University of Paris in the midst of the 
XIVth century.
STEFANO CAROTI
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PARMA
60 We must not forget that the allusion to glossa occamica in the 5th question of the first book 
is preceded by Oresme’s refusal of the conventional origin of the term ‘ens’; see supra, n. 
39.
61 To which the following could be added: «Quinta difficultas est quomodo accidens est 
mobile, et est adhuc pulchrior. Ad hoc respondeo quod accidens non est corpus, sicut 
aliqui ymaginantur de albedine, et concedunt quod duo corpora sunt simul. Et ex hoc 
sequitur quod non occupat locum nec habet partes, sicut dictum est; et ideo non dicitur 
proprie nec moveri nec quiescere nec per se, sed per accidens. Secundo, dico quod illud 
moveri per accidens est secundum quid, sicut dicit Aristoteles secundo huius quod indi-
visibile non movetur nisi secundum quid. Et ideo solum dicitur moveri quia inest mobi-
li, vel est in mobili», ORESME, Questiones super Physicam, cit., p. 43.
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